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We will investigate the concept of the self (and its relation to personal identity in  
multiple cyber worlds). This investigation has its own justification, the fact that  
several  questions concerning personal identity are answered by constructing ex-
amples of thought experiments involving fictional worlds. Thus it seems legitimate  
to  us to  discuss  the  problem in the framework of  “concrete” alternative  worlds  
which we call cyber worlds. The next section deals with a brief history of the prob-
lem of personal identity in modern philosophy and introduces the concept of the  
“self”. In section 2 we introduce conceptual frameworks that illustrate the idea of  
the self as composed of information in multiple cyber worlds and as a result pose  
some important questions to be investigated further, we finally conclude with sec-
tion 3 and we consider how some concepts from anthropology may be applied to the  
study of the Cyberspace. Some authors tend to confuse, or overlap the concept of  
virtual  communities or  reality with the concept of  Cyberspace because this is  a  
rather vague concept. In this paper we consider virtual communities and virtual  
reality as just one portion of the Cyberspace. At the moment we are not going to try  
to answer fundamental ontological questions such as: what is Cyberspace? Is it or  
does it have a dimension? We assume that there exists a Cyberspace, a sort of elec -
tromagnetic space (and this space may be divide into modules), where a virtual in-
teraction might be created and we will refer to this as a virtual world.
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1. SOME CLASSICAL THEORIES
A tree and rock,  let  say, can be distinguished in terms of their  different 
properties. We might then go further and insist that this also forms the basis 
for  ascribing  individuality  to  them.  This  forms the basis  of  the so-called 
‘bundle’ view of individuality, according to which an individual is nothing 
but a bundle or properties. We could write this as follow: 
IO1=(p1,…………..,pn)
Where the identity of an object O1 is denoted by I(O1) and it is given by 
the list of properties p1….p  which are the properties  that  individuate 
this  object.  On this  view,  no  two individuals  can  be absolutely  indistin-
guishable, or indiscernible, in the sense of possessing exactly the same set of 
properties. This last claim has been expressed as the Principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles (Leibniz, see Loemker,1969).
A more thorough-going criticism of this property based approach to in-
dividuality insists that it conflates epistemological  issues concerning how 
we distinguish objects, with ontological issues concerning the metaphysical 
basis  of  individuality.  Thus,  it  is  argued,  to  talk of distinguishability  re-
quires at least two objects but we can imagine a universe in which there ex-
ists only one. In such a situation, it is claimed, it would be inappropriate to 
say that the object is  distinguishable but not that it  is  an individual.  Al-
though we do not actually find ourselves in such situations, of course, still,  
it is insisted, distinguishability and individuality should be kept conceptu-
ally distinct. 
If this line of argument is accepted, then the principle of individuality 
must be sought in something over and above the properties of an object.  
One candidate is the notion of substance, in which properties are taken to 
inhere in some way. The English philosopher John Locke (1632 – 1704) is 
one of the great pioneers in this area of research in the modern ages. In his  
fundamental work “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding” Locke 
claims that personal identity is founded on consciousness, and not on the 
substance of either the body or the soul.  We are the same person in the 
sense  of  continuous  consciousness  between  past  and  present  in  our 
thoughts and memories. Thus personal identity is fundamentally based on 
the repeated act of consciousness. In this respect personal identity is iden-
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tity  of  consciousness  and not  identity  of some substance  (the body may 
change, but the person remains the same, argues Locke). 
We can  also  draw a  distinction  between two sorts  of  question  about 
identity. First, we can ask what makes it true that an individual that we en-
countered at one time is the same individual that we have encountered at 
some earlier time. This is a metaphysical question – a question about being. 
It can be distinguished from a second question: how can we tell that an item 
encountered at one time is the same individual as that encountered at an-
other? This is an epistemological question – a question about knowing.
The difference between the epistemological and the metaphysical ques-
tion needs to be kept in mind when considering identity in virtual worlds. 
What “criterion” we can use to tell the difference between one thing and an-
other is  an epistemological consideration; a metaphysical  consideration is 
one that determines whether one item is identical with another. The prob-
lem of identity over time is first and foremost a problem about change. How 
much can an individual change and yet remain the same individual? Are 
there particular kinds of change that an individual cannot undergo without 
ceasing  to  exist  as  the  same  individual?  Certainly  there  are  innocuous 
changes and everyday changes that individual items undergo without any 
threat to their identity. You can repaint your chair, yet the chair remains the 
same chair.
But there are limits; there are changes that you could make to your chair 
that would mean that the chair no longer existed. If you were to dismantle 
the chair and use the pieces to make a sledge, we could not say that the 
sledge was the same thing as the chair. But suppose that you dismantle the 
chair and immediately put the pieces back together in exactly the same way. 
In this case, many people would say that you have the same chair, however 
this raises some puzzles. Did the chair still exist while it was dismantled? 
Or did it go out of existence for a time, and then come back into existence? 
In the next section the areas that have been discussed here will be examined 
further in relation to the idea of “identity” in MUD’s. 
2. SELF AND CYBERSPACE
Gilbert  Ryle in  “The Concept  of  Mind” (1949) provided a description of 
René Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism (where a categorical (ontological) dis-
tinction between mental activity and physical activity is presented) introdu-
cing the expression “the doctrine of the ghost  in  the machine”.  Personal 
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identity is conceived with a psycho logistic conception based on the doc-
trine of the Ghost in the Machine and with a materialistic characteristic. In 
this “Cartesian Theater”, using terminology developed by Daniel Dennett 
(Dennett, 1991), the Self is not attached to the physical body, but rather is  
comprised of a collection of mental states. This vision of personal identity 
has a deep relationship with contemporary information theories. We may 
here look to Daniel  Dennett’s  “Multiple  Drafts Model of  Consciousness” 
which is a theory of consciousness based upon cognitivism and views the 
mind in terms of information processing. 
According to this model, there are a variety of sensory inputs from a giv-
en event and also a variety of interpretations of these inputs. The sensory 
inputs arrive in the brain and are interpreted at different times, so a given 
event can give rise to a succession of discriminations, constituting the equi-
valent of multiple drafts of a story. As soon as each discrimination is accom-
plished, it becomes available for eliciting behavior; it does not have to wait 
to be presented at the theatre. In the next section we will look to this con-
ceptual model for an explanation of the evolution of the real self when it in-
teracts with the virtual environment.
Following Norbert Weiner’s words,  the father of cybernetics,  we may 
say that a person is something which can be sent in a telegraph, indicating 
that the self can be considered as a body of information. The main point is 
that, if a person is constituted of nothing more than thoughts and memories, 
in other words, composed of information then this information can be re-
duced to a collection of bits. “The conception of Self as a body of informa-
tion is realized in a rather interesting fashion in life on-line (Second Life). In 
the process of constructing an identity on the internet , (homepage, nick-
name, and behaviour-text-based information)  as a person runs more and 
more  of  his/her  life  on-line,  so  the  manner  in  which  he/she  presents 
him/herself  on-line constitutes a more central component of his/her iden-
tity”  (Shay,  2006).  We  also  might  go  further  with  our  analogy  of  the 
thoughts and memories with bits and say that people are simply programs, 
these programs act not only in the real world but also in virtual worlds and 
in general in the cyberspace.
Figure 1 below is one way such a representation can be viewed. Let the 
“real” world be symbolized by W, this is the world where the individual ex-
ists  and  performs  the  daily  duties  concerning  survival.  The  self  in  this 
world can therefore be symbolized by S(w) and according to what has been 
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discussed above we could say that S(w) is composed of information from 
the real world, W this can be partly formalized as: 
Sw=Ir1,Ir2, ……., Irn
Now, in the cyber world C1 the “self” can be represented as S(C1). The 
process of composition of this “new self” in the cyber world may utilize 
part of the information content Irx from the real world W, via such an inter-
action with the cyber world C1 a “new self” S(C1) is “created”, composed of 
specific information from the cyber world C1 and the real world W. 
SC1=Ic11,Ic12, …, Irx …., Irc1n
An important point to note here is that S (C1) is a relation of S (W), we 
could represent this as follows:
SC1=R(SW)
“R” takes on the role of a “psychological continuous” relation to be de-
tailed later on. For example, part of  what characterizes the self in the real 
world (I have labeled this as S(W) ) could be represented by certain inform-
ation content that the individual has experienced in the real world, such as 
generally being a generous person and in particular under certain circum-
stances being generous for self interested reasons. Experience related to this 
particular virtuous character could be symbolized by Irx. When this indi-
vidual interacts with the cyber world , C1 (under a different character)  Irx is 
utilized to ones advantage with experiences encountered in the cyber world 
C1 and as a result of this interaction a new “self” S(C1) is formed in this Cy-
ber World. There is therefore a relationship between the real world and the 
cyber world formed by such an interaction. We could assume that there are 
two series  of  thoughts governed by their  respective information content, 
and that they are both mine, one in the cyber world and the other in the real 
world, although these thought processes take place in distinct spatio-tem-
poral locations one could consider the feedback and the formation of the 
“new self” S(C1) associated with the formation of memories with informa-
tion content relating to events in the cyber world and the real world.
Here we can look to Taylor (2002) who discusses how social life gets cre-
ated online and how attendant communication occurs; he says that avatars 
are particularly powerful artifacts to consider. They prove to be the material 
out of which relationships and interactions are embodied: much as in offline 
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life with its corporeal bodies, digital bodies are used in a variety of ways- to 
greet, to play, to signal group affiliation, to convey opinion or feelings, and 
to create closeness. At a very basic level, Taylor says that bodies root us and 
make us present to ourselves and to others. Avatars form one of the central  
points  at  which  users  intersect  with  technological  objects  and  embody 
themselves, making the virtual environment and the variety of phenomen-
on it fosters real.
In the above example the notion of presence in virtual worlds is invoked 
to relate information content Irx from my real self to the “creation” of the 
virtual  self  in  the  cyber  world (see  Fig.  1).  Taylor  continues  to  say  that 
“presence” is one of the most elusive and evocative aspects of virtual sys-
tems- and yet it forms the very foundation on which immersion is built. It 
goes to the heart of what feels “real” and creates the quality of experience 
that signals to us “I am here”. There is ample evidence to indicate (see for 
example Warburton 2006) that users do not simply roam through the space 
as “mind”, but find themselves grounded in the practice of the body and 
the world. This grounding of presence in the virtual world not only consists 
of embodied practice,  but  of  embodied social  practice.  The bodies  them-
selves thus act as agents of engagement and in the virtual world users have 
learned to delegate their agency to body-representatives of other individu-
als.
The feedback to the real self could be formed of memories due to a com-
bination of experiences and social interactions with characters in the cyber 
world. One could consider this as two sets of memories (information con-
tent)  in  one mind,  one of them being due to my experiences  in the real 
world and the other belonging to the character in the cyber world. There is  
evidence that this feedback to the real self can be strong. Taylor discusses 
the case of “Meg” where the level of immersion into the virtual world had 
created a strong dependency and a connection with the real self, her digital 
body had come to be tied to her identity. Taylor also discovered that this 
was the case with most users. There are several questions that arise concern-
ing identity of the self in virtual worlds in relation to what we have just dis -
cussed and elaborated upon in the previous section.  For example, how is  
the identity of the real person related to their identity in the virtual world? 
What does the relation “R” that we have invoked consist in?
We may here look to  Bernard Williams who presents similar arguments 
in relation to several puzzles about divided minds in the arena of personal 
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identity. Williams presents arguments that cast doubt on the widely held 
view that people are essentially minds, or that mental or psychological con-
siderations  are  decisive  in  issues  of  personal  identity.  Williams suggests 
that bodily continuity plays a critical role in establishing who the person is 
and  begins  by  proposing  that  a  memory  belief  will  count  as  a  genuine 
memory of an event only if  that memory belief  has been caused by that 
event; he also suggests that it may be important that the causal chain link-
ing  the  event  to  the memory belief  should not  run outside  the person’s 
body. The question how can we distinguish between apparent and genuine 
memories is an old one, and has generated literature of its own. So, if I were  
to originate an avatar in Second Life and experience certain situations as my 
avatar then Williams would say that these memories are not “memory be-
liefs” as the causal link runs outside my body. However, as discussed earli-
er, if there is relational feedback of experiences from the virtual world to the 
real world we could say that such memories could be memory beliefs of the 
type Williams is indicating. How do these memory beliefs relate to my be-
ing psychologically continuous with my avatar? 
Parfit in his book “Reasons and Persons” insists that there is a gradual 
unfolding and development of a particular psychology. With reference to 
Fig 1, what does it mean to say that B’s psychological states are continuous 
with those of A? According to Parfit we could say that a set of psychological 
states S1 can be described as continuous with a later set of psychological 
states S2 if S2 is “developed” from S1 either directly or through a series of in-
tervening  steps.  Such  a  development  process  could be  described  by our 
“psychological continuous” relation. Although this process of development 
may involve change, any changes must be gradual. There are ways in which 
it is natural or appropriate for a line of psychological states to develop; for 
example, my belief that a friend is in danger naturally gives rise to a feeling  
of anxiety and a desire to help. In this sense, a continuous line of psycholo-
gical states will develop in a way that is both gradual and natural. 
Why does Parfit suppose that it is psychological continuity that we care 
about, and not bodily continuity? He seems to be assuming that the pattern 
of our lives depends to a much greater extent on our psychological features  
than our physical qualities.  Parfit introduces the idea of q-memory to get 
around the problem that continuity of memory presupposes identity.  He 
presents a clear definition of q-remembering in his paper and bases psycho-
logical continuity on the notion of q-relations.  The basic notion underlying 
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q-relations, such as q-memory and q-intentions, is that they do not presup-
pose identity of the person.  Paraphrasing Parfit’ s definition of one such q-
relation, q-memory must consist in: (1) a relation with a past experience that 
seems like a memory, (2) the actual happening of such a past experience to 
some person, and (3) the acquisition of the relation with the past experience 
in the normal fashion in which memories are acquired.
Thus, q-relations are a subset of relations (i.e.,  all memories,  both real 
and apparent, are q-memories) and avoid the problem of circularity, by not 
presupposing the identity of the one bearing a memory.  Parfit bases psy-
chological continuity on the continuity of q-relations, such as q-memory, q-
intentions and q-anticipation, rather than on a one-to-one relation, psycho-
logical connectedness, of real memories, as does the memory theory of per-
sonal identity. Utilizing Parfit’s idea we can develop our model and provide 
some substance to the relation “R”, the “psychological continuous” relation 
mentioned earlier. “R” can be related to the idea of q-memory; such a rela-
tion will therefore be a relational mapping between S(W) and S(C) as shown 
in Fig. 1. “R” would therefore be invoked whenever an individual  forms an 
avatar and interacts in the virtual world.
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FIGURE 1: REPRESENTATION OF REAL WORLD SELVES AND THEIR 
INTERACTION WITH THE CYBER WORLDS
We can extend this model and consider the interaction of several cyber 
worlds C1, C2,… this is shown below in Figure 2 on the next page.
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FIGURE 2: REPRESENTATION OF SEVERAL CYBER WORLDS
Considering the interaction of several such multiple cyber worlds there 
are several questions that arise due to such a model: How are these “layers 
of information” formed when the individual experiences these different cy-
ber worlds? Do selves in different cyber worlds have the same kind of mor-
al responsibility as they do in the real world, W? How can we characterize a 
“virtual moral experience” in such multiple cyber worlds?  Questions relat-
ing to identities in cyber worlds having moral status can be considered as 
reasonable  because  we  started  from  our  assumption  that  thoughts  and 
memories are collection of bits or simply programs. The point here is that, if 
this is plausible then the following question might be reasonable and well-
founded as well: do programs have a moral status?
As pointed out by David Cole in “AI and personal identity” (1991), a 
conception of self as a body of information allows the possibility of several  
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persons existing in a single body hence according to the above model S(W),  
S(C1), S(C2),…….., S(Cn) would all exist in a single individual. These ideas 
tend to see unity of body as a motivation to accept a unity of self, but since 
even this conception of unity of body is under attack since the late 20th cen-
tury (see Richard Dawkins The Selfish Gene (1990)), and in light of the con-
tradicting empirical evidence, this position is maintained by a minority of 
thinkers today (Shay, 2006)). Another consequence of the conception of the 
self as body of information is that a person might be seen as something de-
centralized, and less consistent and uniform. 
3. ANTHROPOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE
As it has been widely noticed, Internet life emphasizes this embedding in 
the concept of information. “Life in virtual worlds enables these sorts of di-
visions, which are nothing more than projections of what exists internally. 
Several windows open simultaneously and multiple examples of the Self 
are  replicated  and  projected  into  the  Virtual  space”  (Shay,  2006).   Shay 
called it the complementary approach.  Cyberspace is the arena where divi-
sions of the Self are possible. The space itself has a normative side which en-
courages this splitting and maintains a complementary role. Sherry Turkle 
in her “Construction and Reconstruction of Self in Virtual Reality: Playing 
in the MUD’s” interprets the cyberspace in this manner and it sees it as a 
realization of these ideas. Her references here are definitely Foucault and 
Derrida, who assert that we live in a society that demands a coherent Self.  
Their work also emphasizes the fact that beyond the normative aspect this 
kind of society gives an intrinsic positive value to the self who is monolithic 
and uniform. This depends on the cultural context,  in fact in other com-
munities the lack of consistency and uniformity is not only legitimate, but 
also welcomed. Tribal examples are classic examples of situations where a 
decentralized or divided Self (e.g. a state of trance) is normative. 
Technically these divided states are called “liminal states”; border-states 
where the Self is “neither here nor there”. To the traveler in a rite of pas-
sage, personal characteristics become indistinct. She/he is not as she/he was 
before, but is still not what she/he will become. The liminal state is charac-
terized  by bizarre  elements.  Through abnormal  strangeness,  the  traveler 
goes through a deconstruction and reconstruction of subject.
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Thus the liminal state is infused with creative force and its space is an 
“anthropological arenaS1 hidden and magical. In this manner it configures 
itself as opposed to the familiar space where work and the normal life takes 
place.  “Liminal  entities  are  neither  here  nor  there;  they are  betwixt  and 
between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, 
and ceremonial (Turner, 1964)”. In the modern society appears the liminoid 
state and the difference among them and liminal  assume great relevance 
when we go down to the distinction between play and work. Liminoid phe-
nomena emerge in feudal,  but predominantly capitalistic  societies  with a 
complex social and economic division of labor. With stress on individuality 
and open ended processes,  they are seen to occur within leisure settings 
apart from work, are experimental and exploratory, forming social critique 
and providing the potential for the subversion of the status quo. The es-
sence of liminoid is characterized by the permanent change and the role-
playing aspect which confers to the player a greater freedom and flexibility. 
Thus the main dissimilarity among liminal and liminoid states consists 
of the fact that the former are characterized by transitions towards some 
defined end where the change becomes permanent and stable. In this way 
liminal cultural phenomena are perceived to be collective, integrated, and 
obligatory ritual action of pre modernity (tribal and early agrarian cultures),  
enforced by necessity but containing the potentiality to create new symbols, 
models and ideas. We might see them as collective representations, symbols 
having common intellectual and emotional meaning for all the members of 
the group. On the other hand, liminoid phenomena emerge in feudal, but 
predominantly capitalistic societies with a complex social and economic di-
vision  of labor.  Individuality  and open ended processes  are the key ele-
ments in this context; they are seen to appear when leisure is conceived as 
opposed to work; in this respect they are highly experimental and explorat-
ory, and the form the social critique which could provide the potential for 
the subversion of the status quo. We can interpret liminal as part of the soci-
ety, an aspect of social or religious ritual, while the liminoid is a break from 
the actual society.
1 See  <http://total.eclipse.co.il/2006/10/01/personal-identity-in-the-information-age-dotper-
son-dotcommunity/ - footnote-16-80 >
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FIGURE 3: LIMINOID AND LIMINAL STATE ANALOGIES WITH THE 
SUGGESTED MODEL
In this sense, Cyberspace definitely has some liminoid characteristics; any-
one can plug in and be somebody else for a few hours as depicted by the 
model explained in Figs. 1 and 2 and detailed further in Fig. 3 below. Move-
ment of the individual from the real world, W into the cyber world C1 in or-
der to experience the cyber world and as a result allow a composition of a 
self,  S(C1)  in  this  cyber  world can therefore  be  considered as  a liminoid 
transitional state. Such a state would allow the individual to have experi-
ences that have characteristics of liminal experiences but are optional for the 
individual as such an individual can decide to engage or not engage with 
C1.  The  subject  moves  between leisure  and seriousness,  work  and play, 
enters the virtual world and exits it, essentially a two way relational process 
is initiated once a virtual identity is formed. Liminal evolution of the self  
can be viewed as the composition of “memory” layers of information form-
ing the self after experiences from the virtual world as shown in Figs. 3 and 
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4. Essentially a one way process is taking place between the real and virtual 
worlds.  In  this  manner  every  social  interaction  in  cyberspace  contains  a 
dominant component of playfulness which weakens the normative side of 
work and the cyberspace game becomes a social simulation for the outside 
world in which the main actor is a hybrid social player that moves in a dif-
ferent “dimension” and explores a different “interaction”. 
FIGURE 4: REPRESENTATION OF REAL WORLD SELVES AND THEIR 
INTERACTION WITH THE CYBER WORLDS AS LIMINOID AND LIMINAL 
STATES
4. CONCLUSION
In this introductory paper it has been our intention to produce a framework 
for assisting in the formulation and development of the concept of identity 
in virtual worlds. A two way psychological continuous relation anchored in 
Parfit’s q-memory was put forward as a mode that connects the real self 
with the virtual self (the avatar). From an anthropological point of view a 
liminoid state was related to the two way relation that mediates between 
the real self and the virtual self. The liminal state was related to the evolu-
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tion of layers of information that defines the self in both the real and virtual 
worlds after  the relation has been initiated.  Several  questions  have been 
raised as a result of these elaborations and our intention is to explain theses  
further and provide some answers in further papers.
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